MUSINGS 2
“No Kings!”
I participated in Manhattan, walking from 47th to 14th Street along 7th Avenue.
The age profile was skewed toward old people. There were almost no Blacks, Asians, or Hispanics.
There were no electoral slogans, not even “Vote.” There were no slogans touching on the economy, not even health insurance costs.
The country-wide number of participants in the demonstration was larger than two months ago: the estimates are that about 7 million, 2.6% of adult population, participated last Saturday, as compared to 4-5 million earlier. But looking at the signs people carried I found it striking that one would not know that there exists an opposition party that will contest the forthcoming election.
Given that at various moments in my life I participated in or at least witnessed mass demonstrations in other countries, as I marched I was wondering what is particular about the US. One obvious difference is that general strikes are a weapon of the oppositions in Argentina, Chile, France, Italy, and Spain, but not a political technology available in the US. Another big difference is that, with the notable exception of Gilets Jaunes in France, street demonstrations are called by some pre-existing organizations: political parties, unions, or movements. They do not always act in unison: in France sometimes they are organized separately by different unions. But they are focused by some common slogans, the banners under which people march. These are often targeted at particular policies and they are intended to make the government aware of the electoral threat they represent. Last Saturday, at least in my immediate experience, had none of these features.
Being against something unites, being for something divides. The crowds on Saturday were against the usurpation of power by Trump and there were for democracy. But, following Cas Mudde, the situation we are in now “is a symptom of a malfunctioning liberal democracy.” Restoring democracy will alleviate the symptoms but not the causes. Obviously, symptoms matter but “restoring” just gets us back to the conditions which generated MAGA to begin with. This is why I think that to stimulate renewed confidence in democratic methods, democracy’s defenders must offer a forward-looking perspective that seeks to transform not only political but also economic and social conditions. Such perspectives were absent from the Saturday demonstrations, perhaps because they would divide.
Governing by “deals”
The administration made an offer to nine universities to accept some conditions in exchange for a continued flow of federal funds. If the offer is accepted, the “deal” is a contract enforceable by law, as long as its conditions do not violate some law.
The government can clearly condition federal funding on compliance with some requirements: Title VI (of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) or Title IX (of the Education Act of 1972) are examples. But these conditions were imposed by statute, an act of Congress. Can the executive do it? Is an agreement by private parties sufficient to make it a contract? If I understand correctly, the offer by the executive must be authorized by some law and, as in a private contract, the requirements cannot violate the constitution. So in principle an offer by the executive is not different from a statutory requirement as long as the law authorizes the executive to make such an offer, more narrowly, to control the funds that are being offered.
What remains unclear is who is the contracting party. “The government,” some department of the government? If the deal is offered by the Department of Education, does it bind other parts of the administration? The answer to this question matters because the big issue is whether these deals are credible, that is, whether the private parties that agree to it can expect that it would be complied with by whoever makes the offer. What if Trump changes his mind about a particular university? Will the funds still flow?
How will it end?
I have been obsessing by the fact that we find it difficult to form expectations about how it will all end. I do not want to repeat myself but I have new thoughts.
Consider some measures taken by governments: (A) Erdogan at one time extended the right to vote to Turkish citizens residing abroad. In his language, he was just extending political rights, expanding democracy. (B) Republicans in the US want to require specific documentation at the polls, to avoid electoral fraud. (C) Finally, Orban had his cronies buy legacy media and directed government ads to them.
Now, such measures may be (1) consistent with ordinary life of democracy, in which incumbents try to increase their electoral advantage, (2) steps toward some “mixed,” or “hybrid” regime, “electoral authoritarianism,” in which some opposition is allowed, elections are regularly held, they are almost always won by the incumbent but the opposition has some chance to win, as in Poland, (3) steps toward autocracy, in which elections are not held or the incumbent uses force to win them.
So when we observe a particular step, how do we determine where it leads?
One indication is the rhetoric. Measures (A) and (B) can be justified in the language of democracy, measure (C) is rhetorically neutral with regard to democracy. The governments heading to (1) or (2) never yield to accusations that they are destroying democracy. My favorite is a statement by a Putin propagandist Mikhail Leontiev: “I do not understand what is undemocratic in the fact that some force which enjoys an overwhelming social support wins the elections.” This rhetoric disarms the claims that these measures are anti-democratic. There are no democratic arguments against residents abroad voting in national elections and many democracies allow it. There are no democratic arguments against preventing electoral fraud and all countries require some documentation. There are no democratic arguments against market transactions. Democratic norms can be evoked to criticize such measures only if they cannot plausibly be justified in democratic language, when it is clear that they violate democratic norms, when they are flagrantly directed against the political opposition or its social and economic bases. The language of “enemies within” does violate democratic norms, so it is an indication of the goals. Indeed, having read about thirty Trump’s executive orders, I could not find a reference to “democracy”: they are couched in terms of defending “the Republic.”
When democratic norms are not effective in rejecting a particular measure as anti-democratic, we rely on anticipating its effects or imputing the motivation. Effects such as “Erdogan will win because the Turks in Berlin will vote for him.” Motivations such as “He does it because he thinks it will help him to win.” Yet the putative backsliders may err: Berlusconi did the same as Erdogan and he shot himself in the foot. Republicans may be mistaken about the electoral consequences of requiring a passport or a birth certificate. So we are left with the conclusion that the incumbent is trying to increase the electoral advantage but may be mistaken, which is rather flimsy. For all we know, both Berlusconi and Erdogan may have believed that their measure would expand democratic rights and may have been motivated to expand democracy. Conjectures are not evidence. All we can base our beliefs on are suspicions.
In conclusion, I now think that we are uncertain about the future not only because our deeply ingrained beliefs about democracy in the US being impervious to all threats are shuttered by what we observe but also because all we can observe are steps and we do not know where the path leads. We update feverishly: sending troops to Portland makes us inclined to believe we are heading toward autocracy; 7 million people on the streets make us believe democracy will triumph. Perhaps we update too often, but our prior beliefs are shaky. Democracy and autocracy are final states: when the incumbents lose elections and obey this result or when elections are not held or become just a farce, we know where we are. But anything between them is a limbo that may end one way or another but can also last for an indefinite time.


When a leader adopts many independent measures that could undermine democracy (deploying the army in the streets, masked agents terrorizing people, etc.), that’s a different story. In other words, what country with a solid democracy has ever adopted so many initiatives at once, supposedly to improve democracy?